450 lines
17 KiB
Django/Jinja
450 lines
17 KiB
Django/Jinja
#!/usr/sbin/nft -f
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# {{ ansible_managed }}
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{% macro list(map) -%}
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{{ map | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | map('string') | unique | join(', ') }}
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{%- endmacro %}
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{% macro addr_set(name, type, map) -%}
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set {{ name }} {
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type {{ type }}; flags interval; auto-merge;
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{% if list(map) %}
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elements = { {{ list(map) }} }
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{% endif %}
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}
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{%- endmacro %}
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{% macro addr_list_set(name, type, items) -%}
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set {{ name }} {
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type {{ type }}; flags interval; auto-merge;
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{% if items %}
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elements = { {{ items | join(', ') }} }
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{% endif %}
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}
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{%- endmacro %}
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{% set cluster = firewall.cluster | default({}, true) %}
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{# public_ips of every inventory host: IPv4 per address, IPv6 per /64 (a longer prefix is widened, nft masks the host bits) #}
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{% set public_ips = groups['all'] | map('extract', hostvars, 'public_ips') | select('defined') | flatten | map('string') | unique | list %}
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{% set exempt_v4 = public_ips | reject('search', ':') | map('regex_replace', '^([^/]+)$', '\\1/32') | list %}
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{% set exempt_v6 = public_ips | select('search', ':') | map('regex_replace', '^([^/]+)$', '\\1/128') | map('regex_replace', '/(6[5-9]|[7-9][0-9]|1[01][0-9]|12[0-8])$', '/64') | list %}
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{% set cluster_ifaces = cluster.ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set internal_ifaces = firewall.internal_ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set guest_ifaces = firewall.guest_ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set guest_match = 'iifname { "' ~ (guest_ifaces | join('", "')) ~ '" }' %}
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{% set dnat = firewall.dnat | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | list %}
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{% set masquerade = firewall.masquerade | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set scrapers = firewall.scrapers | default({}, true) %}
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{% set forward_guard = firewall.forward_guard | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | list %}
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{% set blocklists = firewall.spamhaus or firewall.firehol %}
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{% macro port_values(map) -%}
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{{ map | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | map('string') | unique | join(' ') }}
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{%- endmacro %}
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{# Per-service limits apply only to ports the host serves: input for the public and geo ports, forward for DNATed traffic (port forwards of the host and Docker-published ports). #}
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{% set served_input = (port_values(firewall.public.tcp) ~ ' ' ~ port_values(firewall.geo.tcp)).split() %}
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{% set served_forward = (port_values(firewall.public.tcp) ~ ' ' ~ port_values(firewall.geo.tcp) ~ ' ' ~ (dnat | map(attribute='tcp') | map('default', {}, true) | map('dict2items') | sum(start=[]) | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | map('string') | join(' '))).split() %}
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{% set rl = firewall.ratelimit | default({}, true) %}
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{% set rl_factor = rl.range_factor | default({}, true) %}
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{% set rl_services = [] %}
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{% for svc in rl.services | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') %}
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{% set ports = [svc.value.ports] | flatten | map('string') | list %}
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{% set per = svc.value.per | default('minute', true) %}
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{% set burst = svc.value.burst | default(svc.value.rate * 2, true) %}
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{% set _ = rl_services.append({
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'name': svc.key | replace('-', '_'),
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'ports': ports | join(', '),
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'rate': svc.value.rate,
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'burst': burst,
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'syn_rate': svc.value.rate * 2,
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'syn_burst': burst * 2,
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'per': per,
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'f4': svc.value.range_factor_v4 | default(rl_factor.v4 | default(6), true),
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'f6': svc.value.range_factor_v6 | default(rl_factor.v6 | default(3), true),
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'input': (ports | select('in', served_input) | list | length) > 0,
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'forward': (ports | select('in', served_forward) | list | length) > 0,
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}) %}
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{% endfor %}
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{% set rl_input = rl_services | selectattr('input') | list %}
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{% set rl_forward = rl_services | selectattr('forward') | list %}
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# Declare-then-delete makes every load one atomic transaction that replaces
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# only these tables; Cilium, Docker, NetBird and CrowdSec tables stay untouched.
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table inet host {}
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delete table inet host
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table ip host_nat {}
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delete table ip host_nat
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{% if firewall.geo_countries %}
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include "/etc/nftables.d/host-geo.nft"
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.spamhaus %}
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include "/etc/nftables.d/host-spamhaus.nft"
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.firehol %}
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include "/etc/nftables.d/host-firehol.nft"
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.scanners %}
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include "/etc/nftables.d/host-scanners.nft"
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{% endif %}
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table inet host {
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{{ addr_set('admin_v4', 'ipv4_addr', firewall.admin.v4) }}
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{{ addr_set('admin_v6', 'ipv6_addr', firewall.admin.v6) }}
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{{ addr_set('cluster_v4', 'ipv4_addr', cluster.v4) }}
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{{ addr_set('cluster_v6', 'ipv6_addr', cluster.v6) }}
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{{ addr_set('scrapers_v4', 'ipv4_addr', scrapers.v4) }}
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{{ addr_set('scrapers_v6', 'ipv6_addr', scrapers.v6) }}
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{{ addr_list_set('rl_exempt_v4', 'ipv4_addr', exempt_v4) }}
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{{ addr_list_set('rl_exempt_v6', 'ipv6_addr', exempt_v6) }}
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{% for svc in rl_services if svc.input or svc.forward %}
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set rl_{{ svc.name }}_v4 {
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type ipv4_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 65535;
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}
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set rl_{{ svc.name }}_v6 {
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type ipv6_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 65535;
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}
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set rl_{{ svc.name }}_v4r {
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type ipv4_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 16384;
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}
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set rl_{{ svc.name }}_v6r {
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type ipv6_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 16384;
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}
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set rl_hs_{{ svc.name }}_v4 {
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type ipv4_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 65535;
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}
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set rl_hs_{{ svc.name }}_v6 {
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type ipv6_addr; flags dynamic; timeout 10m; size 65535;
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}
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{% endfor %}
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
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{% if blocklists %}
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# Before the established rule: outbound is blocked too, so listed
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# addresses have no legitimate replies.
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{% if firewall.spamhaus %}
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ip saddr @spamhaus_v4 jump spamhaus_in
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ip6 saddr @spamhaus_v6 jump spamhaus_in
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.firehol %}
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ip saddr @firehol_v4 jump firehol_in
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{% endif %}
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{% endif %}
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{% if rl_input %}
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# Before the established rule: the packet that completes a handshake is the second original-direction packet
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# (needs net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct).
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meta l4proto tcp ct state established ct direction original ct original packets 2 jump ratelimit_hs_in
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{% endif %}
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ct state established,related accept
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{% if firewall.scanners %}
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# After the established rule: only inbound connections of scanners drop.
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ip saddr @scanners_v4 jump scanners_in
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ip6 saddr @scanners_v6 jump scanners_in
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{% endif %}
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ct state invalid jump drop_log
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iif lo accept
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icmp type { echo-request, destination-unreachable, time-exceeded, parameter-problem } accept
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icmpv6 type { echo-request, destination-unreachable, packet-too-big, time-exceeded, parameter-problem, nd-router-advert, nd-neighbor-solicit, nd-neighbor-advert, mld-listener-query } accept
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udp sport 67 udp dport 68 accept
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meta nfproto ipv6 udp sport 547 udp dport 546 accept
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{% if cluster_ifaces or list(cluster.v4) or list(cluster.v6) %}
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# ponytail: the cluster ring trusts every port between nodes and pods;
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# per-port lists (6443, 10250, 2379-2380, 4240, 8472, ...) are the upgrade path.
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{% for iface in cluster_ifaces %}
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iifname "{{ iface }}" accept
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{% endfor %}
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iifname "wt0" ip saddr @cluster_v4 accept
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iifname "wt0" ip6 saddr @cluster_v6 accept
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{% endif %}
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{% if internal_ifaces %}
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# ponytail: internal bridges are trusted on every port; per-port lists are the upgrade path.
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{% for iface in internal_ifaces %}
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iifname "{{ iface }}" accept
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{% endfor %}
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{% endif %}
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{% if guest_ifaces %}
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# Pods on k3s guests egress through the node IP, so guest bridges get
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# only DHCP and router solicitations beyond the public zone.
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{{ guest_match }} udp dport 67 accept
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{{ guest_match }} icmpv6 type nd-router-solicit accept
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{% endif %}
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# VPN peers get the vpn ports, then everything public.
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iifname "wt0" jump vpn
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jump public
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# Broadcasts and multicasts are never scans; they stay out of the log.
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meta pkttype { broadcast, multicast } drop
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jump drop_log
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}
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# A single rule makes the limit global: a flood logs at the limit and the
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# rest drops silently. The kernel log line has the iptables LOG fields that
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# the CrowdSec iptables-logs parser reads.
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chain drop_log {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.in_rate }} log prefix "fw-in-drop: "
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drop
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}
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{% if rl_services | selectattr('input') | list or rl_forward %}
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# Per-service limits on new inbound TCP connections (firewall.ratelimit): per source address (IPv4 /32, IPv6 /64) and per
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# range (IPv4 /24, IPv6 /48; the per-source rate times range_factor). Admin, cluster, VPN, guest and internal sources
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# and the public addresses of all inventory hosts (rl_exempt_v4, rl_exempt_v6) are exempt: cluster nodes reach other hosts
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# with their public address (ArgoCD git fetches, mail submission). The public set is checked only here, no other chain
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# trusts it. The handshake meters carry the service limit (rate and burst of firewall.ratelimit): they count the packet that
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# completes a handshake (the second original-direction packet of an established connection), which a spoofed source cannot
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# send, so a real client above the limit is logged with fw-rl-hs: and reset. Only the address tier exists there; ranges are
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# left to CrowdSec. The SYN meters are a looser flood cap at twice the rate and burst: they drop the excess with the log
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# prefixes fw-rl-syn-addr: (per address) and fw-rl-syn-range: (per range), which a spoofed source can trigger, so they are
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# evidence only. Their cap sits above the service limit so that a real client reaches the handshake meter first.
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{% macro rl_exempt() %}
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iifname "wt0" return
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{% for iface in cluster_ifaces + internal_ifaces + guest_ifaces %}
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iifname "{{ iface }}" return
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{% endfor %}
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ip saddr @admin_v4 return
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ip6 saddr @admin_v6 return
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ip saddr @cluster_v4 return
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ip6 saddr @cluster_v6 return
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ip saddr @rl_exempt_v4 return
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ip6 saddr @rl_exempt_v6 return
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{% endmacro %}
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{% for hook, svcs in [('in', rl_input), ('fwd', rl_forward)] if svcs %}
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chain ratelimit_{{ hook }} {
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{{ rl_exempt() }}
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{% for svc in svcs %}
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meta l4proto tcp ct original proto-dst { {{ svc.ports }} } counter jump rl_{{ svc.name }}
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{% endfor %}
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}
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{% endfor %}
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{% for hook, svcs in [('in', rl_input), ('fwd', rl_forward)] if svcs %}
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chain ratelimit_hs_{{ hook }} {
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{{ rl_exempt() }}
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{% for svc in svcs %}
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meta l4proto tcp ct original proto-dst { {{ svc.ports }} } counter jump rl_hs_{{ svc.name }}
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{% endfor %}
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}
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{% endfor %}
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{% for svc in rl_services if svc.input or svc.forward %}
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chain rl_{{ svc.name }} {
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update @rl_{{ svc.name }}_v4 { ip saddr limit rate over {{ svc.syn_rate }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.syn_burst }} packets } counter jump rl_drop_addr
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update @rl_{{ svc.name }}_v6 { ip6 saddr & ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:: limit rate over {{ svc.syn_rate }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.syn_burst }} packets } counter jump rl_drop_addr
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update @rl_{{ svc.name }}_v4r { ip saddr & 255.255.255.0 limit rate over {{ svc.syn_rate * svc.f4 }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.syn_burst * svc.f4 }} packets } counter jump rl_drop_range
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update @rl_{{ svc.name }}_v6r { ip6 saddr & ffff:ffff:ffff:: limit rate over {{ svc.syn_rate * svc.f6 }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.syn_burst * svc.f6 }} packets } counter jump rl_drop_range
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}
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{% endfor %}
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{% for svc in rl_services if svc.input or svc.forward %}
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chain rl_hs_{{ svc.name }} {
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update @rl_hs_{{ svc.name }}_v4 { ip saddr limit rate over {{ svc.rate }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.burst }} packets } counter jump rl_hs_reject
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update @rl_hs_{{ svc.name }}_v6 { ip6 saddr & ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:: limit rate over {{ svc.rate }}/{{ svc.per }} burst {{ svc.burst }} packets } counter jump rl_hs_reject
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}
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{% endfor %}
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# One log limit per prefix, so a flood of spoofed SYNs cannot use up the budget of the handshake evidence.
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chain rl_drop_addr {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.ratelimit_rate }} log prefix "fw-rl-syn-addr: "
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drop
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}
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chain rl_drop_range {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.ratelimit_rate }} log prefix "fw-rl-syn-range: "
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drop
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}
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# The handshake is complete, so the connection has to be ended actively.
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chain rl_hs_reject {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.ratelimit_rate }} log prefix "fw-rl-hs: "
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reject with tcp reset
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}
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.spamhaus %}
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# Own limits, so a listed scanner cannot use up the budget of fw-in-drop.
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# CrowdSec whitelists both prefixes: the lists already ban these networks.
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chain spamhaus_in {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.spamhaus_rate }} log prefix "fw-spamhaus-in: "
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drop
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}
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chain spamhaus_out {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.spamhaus_rate }} log prefix "fw-spamhaus-out: "
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reject
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}
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.firehol %}
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chain firehol_in {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.spamhaus_rate }} log prefix "fw-firehol-in: "
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drop
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}
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chain firehol_out {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.spamhaus_rate }} log prefix "fw-firehol-out: "
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reject
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}
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.scanners %}
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# Own limit and prefix, so scanners use up neither the fw-in-drop budget
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# nor the one of the blocklists. CrowdSec whitelists the prefix: scans of
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# these networks are known and need no decision.
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chain scanners_in {
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limit rate {{ firewall.log.spamhaus_rate }} log prefix "fw-scanners-in: "
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drop
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}
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.block_smtp_out or blocklists %}
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# Outbound mail goes through the mail host only. Loopback stays open for a
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# local MTA; the log lines carry OUT=, which CrowdSec does not count as a scan.
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chain output {
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type filter hook output priority filter; policy accept;
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{% if firewall.spamhaus %}
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ip daddr @spamhaus_v4 jump spamhaus_out
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ip6 daddr @spamhaus_v6 jump spamhaus_out
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.firehol %}
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ip daddr @firehol_v4 jump firehol_out
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.block_smtp_out %}
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oifname != "lo" tcp dport 25 limit rate {{ firewall.log.out_rate }} log prefix "fw-out-reject: "
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oifname != "lo" tcp dport 25 reject with tcp reset
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{% endif %}
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}
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{% endif %}
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chain vpn {
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{% if list(scrapers.tcp) %}
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{% if list(scrapers.v4) %}
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ip saddr @scrapers_v4 tcp dport { {{ list(scrapers.tcp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(scrapers.v6) %}
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ip6 saddr @scrapers_v6 tcp dport { {{ list(scrapers.tcp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.vpn.tcp) %}
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tcp dport { {{ list(firewall.vpn.tcp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.vpn.udp) %}
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udp dport { {{ list(firewall.vpn.udp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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}
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chain public {
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{% if rl_input %}
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ct state new jump ratelimit_in
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.public.tcp) %}
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tcp dport { {{ list(firewall.public.tcp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.public.udp) %}
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udp dport { {{ list(firewall.public.udp) }} } accept
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.geo.tcp) %}
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tcp dport { {{ list(firewall.geo.tcp) }} } jump geo
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{% endif %}
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{% if list(firewall.admin.tcp) %}
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tcp dport { {{ list(firewall.admin.tcp) }} } jump admin
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{% endif %}
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}
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{% if list(firewall.admin.tcp) %}
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chain admin {
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ip saddr @admin_v4 accept
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ip6 saddr @admin_v6 accept
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}
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{% endif %}
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chain geo {
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{% if guest_ifaces %}
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# Guest IPv6 addresses sit inside the geo sets.
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{{ guest_match }} return
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{% endif %}
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ip saddr @admin_v4 accept
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ip6 saddr @admin_v6 accept
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{% if firewall.geo_countries %}
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ip saddr @geo_v4 accept
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ip6 saddr @geo_v6 accept
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{% endif %}
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}
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{% if forward_guard or blocklists or firewall.scanners or rl_forward %}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
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{% if rl_forward %}
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# Docker-published ports and port forwards arrive here after DNAT; pod and guest egress is not DNATed.
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ct status dnat ct state new jump ratelimit_fwd
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meta l4proto tcp ct status dnat ct state established ct direction original ct original packets 2 jump ratelimit_hs_fwd
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.spamhaus %}
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ip saddr @spamhaus_v4 jump spamhaus_in
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ip6 saddr @spamhaus_v6 jump spamhaus_in
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ip daddr @spamhaus_v4 jump spamhaus_out
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ip6 daddr @spamhaus_v6 jump spamhaus_out
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{% endif %}
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{% if firewall.firehol %}
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ip saddr @firehol_v4 jump firehol_in
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ip daddr @firehol_v4 jump firehol_out
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
{% if firewall.scanners %}
|
|
|
|
ct state new ip saddr @scanners_v4 jump scanners_in
|
|
ct state new ip6 saddr @scanners_v6 jump scanners_in
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
{% for guard in forward_guard %}
|
|
|
|
# {{ guard.key }}
|
|
{% set ifaces = guard.value.ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
|
|
{% for fam, l3, icmp in [('v4', 'ip', 'icmp'), ('v6', 'ip6', 'icmpv6')] if list((guard.value[fam] | default({}, true)).daddr) %}
|
|
{% set zone = guard.value[fam] %}
|
|
{% set match = l3 ~ ' daddr { ' ~ list(zone.daddr) ~ ' }' %}
|
|
{{ match }} ct state established,related accept
|
|
{% if ifaces %}
|
|
{{ match }} iifname { "{{ ifaces | join('", "') }}" } accept
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
{% if list(zone.tcp) %}
|
|
{{ match }} tcp dport { {{ list(zone.tcp) }} } accept
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
{% if list(zone.icmp) %}
|
|
{{ match }} {{ icmp }} type { {{ list(zone.icmp) }} } accept
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
{{ match }} jump drop_log
|
|
{% endfor %}
|
|
{% endfor %}
|
|
}
|
|
{% endif %}
|
|
}
|
|
{% if dnat or masquerade %}
|
|
|
|
table ip host_nat {
|
|
chain prerouting {
|
|
type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept;
|
|
{% for fwd in dnat %}
|
|
{% for proto in ['tcp', 'udp'] if list(fwd[proto]) %}
|
|
ip daddr {{ fwd.daddr }} {{ proto }} dport { {{ list(fwd[proto]) }} } dnat to {{ fwd.to }}
|
|
{% endfor %}
|
|
{% endfor %}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chain postrouting {
|
|
type nat hook postrouting priority srcnat; policy accept;
|
|
{% for match in masquerade %}
|
|
{{ match }} masquerade
|
|
{% endfor %}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
{% endif %}
|