host_firewall: forward_policy defaults to drop
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@@ -131,10 +131,10 @@ firewall:
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# forwarding hosts (Kubernetes with Cilium, Docker, routing peers) otherwise route packets for foreign destinations that
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# forwarding hosts (Kubernetes with Cilium, Docker, routing peers) otherwise route packets for foreign destinations that
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# the datacenter sends to them back out. An uplink (see above) is already covered and left out.
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# the datacenter sends to them back out. An uplink (see above) is already covered and left out.
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no_reflect: {}
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no_reflect: {}
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# Forward chain default. accept: forwarded traffic passes unless a rule above drops it. log: traffic that no accept rule
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# Forward chain default. drop: forwarded traffic that no rule admits (replies, DNATed connections, trusted interfaces:
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# (replies, DNATed connections, trusted interfaces: wt0, cluster, internal and guest ifaces, routed_v6 bridges) admits is
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# wt0, cluster, internal and guest ifaces, routed_v6 bridges, forward_ifaces, pod interfaces) is logged with fw-fwd-drop:
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# logged with fw-fwd-drop: and counted, to find the interfaces a host still needs. drop: the same traffic is dropped.
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# and dropped. log: the same, but nothing is dropped. accept: no tail, forwarded traffic passes unless a rule above drops it.
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forward_policy: accept
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forward_policy: drop
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# Interfaces (name -> interface, wildcards allowed) whose forwarded traffic is accepted without trusting their input,
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# Interfaces (name -> interface, wildcards allowed) whose forwarded traffic is accepted without trusting their input,
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# e.g. a transit bridge to a guest that only needs routing.
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# e.g. a transit bridge to a guest that only needs routing.
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forward_ifaces: {}
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forward_ifaces: {}
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
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- name: Check the forward policy
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- name: Check the forward policy
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ansible.builtin.assert:
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ansible.builtin.assert:
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that: firewall.forward_policy | default('accept', true) in ['accept', 'log', 'drop']
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that: firewall.forward_policy | default('drop', true) in ['accept', 'log', 'drop']
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fail_msg: "firewall.forward_policy is {{ firewall.forward_policy }}, expected accept, log or drop"
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fail_msg: "firewall.forward_policy is {{ firewall.forward_policy }}, expected accept, log or drop"
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- name: Remove the include block of the old nftables role
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- name: Remove the include block of the old nftables role
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@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ table inet host {
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ip6 saddr @geo_v6 accept
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ip6 saddr @geo_v6 accept
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{% endif %}
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{% endif %}
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}
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}
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{% set forward_policy = firewall.forward_policy | default('accept', true) %}
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{% set forward_policy = firewall.forward_policy | default('drop', true) %}
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{% set forward_ifaces = firewall.forward_ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set forward_ifaces = firewall.forward_ifaces | default({}, true) | dict2items | rejectattr('value', 'none') | map(attribute='value') | unique | list %}
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{% set forward_trusted = (([] if 'external' in group_names else ['wt0']) + cluster_ifaces + internal_ifaces + guest_ifaces + forward_ifaces) | unique | list %}
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{% set forward_trusted = (([] if 'external' in group_names else ['wt0']) + cluster_ifaces + internal_ifaces + guest_ifaces + forward_ifaces) | unique | list %}
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{% if forward_guard or blocklists or firewall.scanners or rl_forward or firewall.block_smtp_out or firewall.uplinks or no_reflect or forward_policy != 'accept' %}
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{% if forward_guard or blocklists or firewall.scanners or rl_forward or firewall.block_smtp_out or firewall.uplinks or no_reflect or forward_policy != 'accept' %}
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@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ table inet host {
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# What is forwarded on purpose: replies, connections DNATed here, traffic that arrives on a trusted interface (mesh,
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# What is forwarded on purpose: replies, connections DNATed here, traffic that arrives on a trusted interface (mesh,
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# cluster, internal and guest interfaces) and traffic to the pods (Cilium translates services before netfilter, so
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# cluster, internal and guest interfaces) and traffic to the pods (Cilium translates services before netfilter, so
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# connections from outside arrive as client -> pod without ct status dnat). One rule per interface: a set that mixes
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# connections from outside arrive as client -> pod without ct status dnat). One rule per interface: a set that mixes
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# wildcards and plain names did not match wt0. Everything else is logged and, with forward_policy drop, dropped.
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# wildcards and plain names did not match wt0. Everything else is logged (fw-fwd-drop:, the first place to look when a Cilium or network change breaks forwarding), counted and, with forward_policy drop, dropped. Reflected packets drop above, silently.
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ct state established,related accept
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ct state established,related accept
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ct status dnat accept
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ct status dnat accept
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{% for iface in forward_trusted %}
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{% for iface in forward_trusted %}
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