host_firewall: uplinks drop new forwarded connections that were not DNATed, replaces no_hairpin_ifaces

host_firewall/defaults/main.yml

@@ -116,10 +116,11 @@ firewall:
   # of any host, and ones holding an address of the host are left out
   # (/etc/nft-host-scanners.allowlist). Refreshed daily by nft-host-scanners.
   scanners: true
-  # Bridges and uplinks whose forwarded traffic may not leave through the interface it came in on (iifname X oifname X
-  # drop). The datacenter gateway routes packets for foreign addresses of the subnet to the host; with ip_forward they
-  # would be forwarded back out and masqueraded with the host address. Not for a bridge that carries guests.
-  no_hairpin_ifaces: {}
+  # Uplink interfaces (name -> interface). New forwarded connections that arrive on one are dropped unless they were
+  # DNATed here or a forward_guard zone admits the destination. The datacenter gateway routes packets for foreign
+  # addresses of the subnet to the host; with ip_forward they would be forwarded and masqueraded with the host address.
+  # Not for hosts whose forwarded inbound traffic is not DNATed in netfilter (Cilium NodePorts are DNATed in BPF).
+  uplinks: {}
   # Reject outbound TCP 25; the mail group turns it off.
   block_smtp_out: true
   # EU-27 plus CH, NO, GB, IS, LI (ipdeny country codes). Empty leaves the geo

host_firewall/templates/host.nft.j2

@@ -441,14 +441,10 @@ table inet host {
 		ip6 saddr @geo_v6 accept
 {% endif %}
 	}
-{% if forward_guard or blocklists or firewall.scanners or rl_forward or firewall.block_smtp_out or firewall.no_hairpin_ifaces %}
+{% if forward_guard or blocklists or firewall.scanners or rl_forward or firewall.block_smtp_out or firewall.uplinks %}
 
 	chain forward {
 		type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
-{% for name, iface in firewall.no_hairpin_ifaces.items() %}
-
-		iifname "{{ iface }}" oifname "{{ iface }}" counter drop comment "{{ name }}: no forwarding back out of the uplink"
-{% endfor %}
 {% if rl_forward %}
 
 		# Docker-published ports and port forwards arrive here after DNAT; pod and guest egress is not DNATed.
@@ -496,6 +492,11 @@ table inet host {
 		{{ match }} jump drop_log
 {% endfor %}
 {% endfor %}
+{% for name, iface in firewall.uplinks.items() if iface is not none %}
+
+		# {{ name }}: from outside only what was DNATed here or admitted by a forward_guard zone above.
+		iifname "{{ iface }}" ct state new ct status & dnat == 0 counter drop
+{% endfor %}
 {% if firewall.block_smtp_out %}
 
 		# Pod, container and guest egress to tcp/25 is rejected like the host's own (chain output). Connections DNATed to